Nowadays there is a large variety of technological developments oriented to providing security for the recognition of the authenticity of products, credential, and other kind of documents, and also meant for the prevention of the unauthorized reproduction of the data stored onto them. None of the available products provides a level of security reliable enough to avoid the ever increasing identity theft activities that are a result of the vulnerability of the available technologies. Among them, as a mode of example, we can mention the following:
1. Magnetic-Strip:
A widely spread technology, but with important security weaknesses resulting from the easy downloading of its information and the cloning by card-to-card copying practices.
2. Radio Frequency Identification Chip (RFID):
This technique was introduced into the market as a technology for the replacement of the magnetic-strip in applications such as credit cards, ID cards, etc. However, RFID is extremely easy to copy and it also has the strong disadvantage that it can be read from certain distances without the knowledge of the owner. On the Web, there is abundant information and research available on the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of this technology provided by universities, technicians and independent researchers, as well as damified users themselves.
3. Microchip:
It was initially conceived to store great amounts of information and not meant to provide security against access or copying. Its introduction to the Security Market occurred at a time when both the access and storage capacity of the Data Bases was limited, justifying the recording of all data onto the support-card. Nowadays, Data Bases offer huge possibilities and the trend has been reversed, focusing not on saving all the information onto the support, but looking for the most secure “access key” capable of opening files and registry located in remote Data Bases. Because the RFID's security barrier consists of encrypted mathematical algorithms that can be easily cracked or hacked, the vulnerability of this technology remains high.
4. Surface Scanners:
This technology operates by the laser scanning of a surface to be identified, recording the tracking points (traces), and then comparing them to a given pattern for positive identification. This procedure does not allow for the recording of any kind of codes, it merely recognizes whether the scanned surface is the same as the one stored on the registry. This has many operational and technological disadvantages due to:                A large amount of information (tracking points) is required to avoid the “repetition” of patterns between different supports, and produce positive identifications.        Some kinds of surfaces (for example, plastics) can be worn out or permanently modified by its normal and regular use, resulting in the continuous and uncontrolled modification of the surface-support.        It does not allow for the assignment of data or the recording of controlled information.        
Among specific prior art disclosures in which identity information is concealed from the naked eye is that disclosed in U.S. Pat. No. 5,522,623 (Soules) which describes a card in which coding indicia are included on a layer of a laminate which is concealed from human view and the indicia are read by use of a conventional electro optic reader using a beam of light at a wavelength absorbed by the material in which the coded indicia are present but reflected by the background used. PCT publication WO90/00980 (Elba Holding BV) describes a laminated identification document in which some marks are invisibly coded but fluoresce under ultraviolet radiation. PCT Publication WO 2005/035271 (Gieske & Devrient GMBH) describes a coding system in which luminescent substances are associated with each other where the emission spectra of the two substances overlap in at least one partial area of the known emission range so that the spectrum of the one completes that of the other. PCT Publication WO 02/070279 (Gieske & Devrient GMBH) describes an authenticity feature for valuable documents using a doped matrix-lattice based luminescent substance wherein the doped lattice has a strong crystal field and is doped with at least one chromophore of electron configuration (3d)2. British Patent Publication 1,424.442 (Transaction Technology Inc.) describes a coded identity card having plastic layers in which there are coded areas between the inner surfaces of layers wherein the coding is read by passing radian energy of a given frequency and sufficient intensity through the card. British patent Publication 2,372,232 (De La Rue International Limited) describes a security card with luminescent material exhibiting fluorescent, phosphorescent or anti-Stokes properties on one or more polymer layers.
In my earlier application Ser. No. 11/749,324, I described a security system which utilizes the change in waveform of electromagnetic radiation as it interacts with material having chromatic properties.
The present invention, contrary to the current technology, provides a high degree of security in terms of preventing data to be cloned. This is possible because the information is not produced by the administration of chemical products or inks (which could be found in the market) neither by use of a reading technique—as could be the wavelength matching to some inks or pigments (which could be reproduced simply sweeping in a search all along the frequency spectrum), but configuring a DATA STRUCTURE located onto blocks—monolithic units—susceptible of producing specific information (in the form of interference patterns) when bombarded by a beam of electromagnetic radiation. These STRUCTURES will inevitably be destroyed by any attempt to access the data, and in this way the information obtainable from them will be lost. It is also impossible to access the information via scanning procedures without the prior knowledge of the very complex parameters involved in the reading procedure because of the very linked status between the complex results (the interference patterns “drawn” at the output) and the input conditions (the bombarding source). In other terms: Any arbitrary result could be obtained from bombarding the DATA BLOCKS randomly, and thereof, for there is only a single and expected result to match for each point of the block measured (sample points) at a given time of a sequence (changing wave form of the source), there is no way to get all the billions of variables right, and then perform a reverse engineering practice. The complex parameters required to do so are stored on chips located in the reader devices and protected by sophisticated mechanisms (electronic traps) that burn them, or in some cases volatilize the settings and matrices they store upon any unauthorized attempt to gain access to their memories.